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Posthumous Conception: A Private or Public Matter? 
Laurence C. Nolan' 
[T]he earth belongs in usufruct to the living ... the dead have neither 
powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by an individual ceases 
to be his when he ceases to be, and reverts to society. 1 
The fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the 
most responsible actions in the range of human life. To undertake this 
responsibility-to bestow a life which may be either a curse or a bless-
ing-unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have at least 
the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, it is a crime against that 
being 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American law and culture have long recognized the value of individ-
ual nghts and the need to protect these rights from governmental interfer-
ence.3 Over the past thirty years, the United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly attempted to protect individual rights from governmental in-
terference.4 Because the American tradition of valuing these rights con-
tinues, the need to adequately recognize and protect existing or develop-
ing individual rights grows, particularly with modern advancements m 
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of Law. B.S. Howard University, 1961; J.D., University of Michigan School of Law, 1974. My 
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of Family Law Conference on Parent and Child in North American Family Law, co-hosted by the 
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1. 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392 (Julian P. Boyd, ed., Princeton University 
Press I 958)(1ctter to James Madison dated Sept. 6, 1789). 
2. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Protecting The Unconceived: Nonexistence. Avoidability. And 
Reproductive Technology, 3 I ARIZ. L. REv. 487, 487 n. I (1989)(quoting J.S. Mill). 
3. The Declaration of Independence~ 2 (U.S. I 776). Tite first ten amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution are commonly referred to as the "Bill of Rights". John A. Robertson, Reproduction 
and Rights: A Response to Dorothy Roberts, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1023 (1995). 
4. See. e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(right to marital privacy); 
Zablocki v. Rcdhail, 434 U.S. 374 (I 977)(right to marry); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 
U.S 678 (1977)(right to use contraceptives). 
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science and technology. Among those individual rights significantly im-
pacted by scientific progress is the right of procreation. Perpetuating 
one's bloodline and contributing to the perpetuation of the human race is 
fundamental to most Americans.5 Modem science has given us more con-
trol and greater opportunity with respect to procreation, but it has also 
complicated the intersection where individual rights and governmental 
interference meet. Technology has enabled us to have sex without con-
ception and conception without sex. This technology has allowed infertile 
couples to enjoy conceiving, bearing, and parenting genetically-related 
offspring in far greater numbers than was possible even fifty years ago. 6 
Procreation now can be accomplished after death.7 
This article explores the issue of posthumous conception,8 and ad-
dresses whether it should be treated as a private or a public matter. The 
article begins by examining the current approach to artificial reproduc-
tJon and concludes that law and ethics have both viewed it as a private 
matter, because of the theories of personal autonomy and the intent of the 
users-theories that generally limit state interference. The article then 
proposes that posthumous conception should be treated more as a novel 
societal concept. As such, the law should develop its own legal doctrine 
and not rely on analogies to contract, probate, or gift law. In determining 
how the law should approach this concept, this article will argue that 
posthumous conception is not protected by the Constitution as a funda-
mental right or interest. Therefore, the state is not required to show a 
compelling interest before interfering. If there is no protected fundamen-
tal right, then the state has greater freedom to develop legal doctrine. 
Thus, the state can take a more comprehensive and balanced approach 
than simply following the individual rights polestar. The article next ex-
amines the various personal interests and public policies involved m post-
humous conception. Finally, the article concludes that although there is a 
5. Some commentators use the term procreative liberty, especially in connection with the 
new reproductive technologies. See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND 
THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22 (paperback ed. 1994)[hereinafte r CHILDREN OF CHOICE] 
(where he defines procreative liberty at its most general level as "the freedom either to have 
children or to avoid having them"). 
6. /d. 
7. See, e.g., Hart v. Shalala, No. 94-3944 (E.D La. Dec. 12, 1993). In this case, a widow 
filed suit to obtain social security survivor's benefits for her daughter who was posthumously 
conceived, using the sperm of her deceased husband. The Social Security Administration denied 
survivorship benefits because under Louisiana law the daughter was not a "child" of the decedent. 
Later, The Social Security Administration settled the case and awarded survivorship benefits. See 
also. Benefits Awarded to In-Vitro Child, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at AS; Hecht v. Superior 
Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 ( 1993)(donee of sperm requested release of deceased donor's sperm 
which donor had willed to her so that she could be artificially inseminated) 
8. Posthumous conception is also referred to as postmortem or post-mortem ~oncepllon. 
See. e.g, E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm The Law of 
Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229 (1987). 
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state interest in respecting the interests of its citizens in using this tech-
nology, the state has greater interests that justify tighter regulation. The 
article ultimately proposes that posthumous conception doctrine be 
shaped by the principle of providing the would-be child with at least a 
minimum quality of life. 
II. PRESENT APPROACH TO ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION 
A. Artificial Reproduction Methods 
The main purpose of artificial reproduction is to help infertile cou-
ples reproduce through noncoital reproduction. The following discussion 
describes the most prominent of the noncoital reproduction methods. The 
oldest of these methods, artificial insemination,9 has been practiced since 
the 1950s 10 in large numbers in the United States. 11 The process allows 
sperm 12 to be artificially inserted into the woman's body to fertilize her 
egg. 13 Artificial insemination allows an infertile or impotent husband to 
conceive genetically-related children with his wife. 14 On the other hand, 
artificial insemination by donor 15 allows the wife to have a genetically-
related offspring, with the husband sharing the responsibility of rearing 
the child. 
The traditional surrogacy contract arrangement16 developed as an-
other method of artificial assisted reproduction. Traditional surrogacy 
allows a husband to have genetically-related offspring when his wife can-
not conceive or give birth to a child. 17 In this method, another woman, 
9. For a history of artificial insemination see Ronald S. Jacobs & J. Peter Luedtke, Note, 
Social And Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, 1965 WIS. L. REv. 859, 859-862 
(1965); George P. Smith, II, Through A Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 
67 MICH. L. REv. 127, 128-129 (1968-69). 
10. John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, And Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure 
of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939 (1986). 
II. The Royal Society of London first reported a case of artificial insemination done in 
humans in 1799 and attributed the case to physician, John Hunter. See Jacobs, supra note 9, at 
860. 
12. Throughout this article the terms sperm, egg, ovum, ova and gametes will be used. Egg 
and ovum are interchangeable terms. A gamete is either a sperm or an egg. 
13. The process of inserting the sperm into the cervix can be done w1thout medical 
assistance although it is done in most instances by a licensed physician. See Jhordan C. v. Mary 
K., 224 Cal. Rtpr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986). 
14. This process is called Artificial Insemination, Husband (AIH). Jacobs, supra note 9, at 
859. 
15. This method is called Artificial Insemination, Donor (AID). The donor is a man other 
than the woman's husband. The donor usually remains anonymous. This method is also widely 
used by lesbian couples. 
16. The traditional surrogacy contract arrangement is not the same as the gestational 
surrogacy contract. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
17. An unmanied man, as well as an unmarried couple, could also enter into a surrogacy 
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also known as the surrogate, 18 is artificially inseminated by the husband's 
sperm. After giving birth to the child, the woman releases the child to the 
husband and his wife. 19 
The explosion in the development of new methods of conception as 
well as the tremendous public interest in artificial assisted reproduction 
resulted from the development of in-vitro fertilization. 20 This method al-
lows the fertilization of the egg and sperm to occur outside of the 
woman's body. 21 The ovum is removed from the woman's body (ex-
tracted from her ovarian follicle) and is fertilized by a single sperm in a 
laboratory petrie dish. 22 The fertilized egg,23 after it develops for several 
days, is implanted into a woman's uterus to initiate pregnancy.24 This 
technology allows an infertile couple to have genetically-related off-
spring. Hence, the husband's sperm fertilizes the wife's egg, 
extracorporeally in the laboratory. The fertilized egg is implanted in the 
woman's uterus. Users of this method also include unmarried and homo-
sexual couples. 
In-vitro fertilization makes possible the separation of genetic mother-
hood from gestational motherhood so that the birth mother may not be 
genetically related to the child. This remarkable process has created the 
"donor egg" and the "donor embryo" methods. In either method, a 
woman allows her eggs to be removed from her body and donated to 
someone else.25 When a couple uses the donor egg method, the husband's 
sperm and the donor's egg are extracorporeally fertilized and implanted 
in the wife's uterus to initiate pregnancy. 26 The wife gives birth to a child, 
who is genetically unrelated to her. The wife is the gestational mother. 
The egg donor is the genetic mother. Similarly, in the donor embryo 
contract. 
18. The term "surrogacy mother" is really a misnomer since the woman being artificially 
inseminated is the child's biological parent. See infra note 28 and accompanying text for the true 
surrogacy arrangement. 
19. The wife usually adopts the child. 
20. Robertson, supra note I 0, at 940. 
21. Doctors Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe of London, England are credited with 
developing in-vitro fertilization. Their first successful birth of a child occurred in England on July 
15, 1978. Robertson, supra note 10, at 939-940. These same doctors are also credited with 
developing the process of freezing the fertilized egg until it is needed for implantation. Clifton 
Perry and L. Kristen Schneider, Cryopreserved Embryos: Who Shall Decide Their Fate?, 13 J. 
LEGAL MED. 463 (1992). See also infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
22. Robertson, supra note I 0, at 940. 
23. A fertilized egg in its earliest stages of division is called a preembryo or a zygote. 
Robert M. L. Winston & Alan H. Handyside, New Challenges in Human In-vitro Fertilization, 
260 Sci. 932, 933 (1993). 
24. Robertson, supra note 10, at 948. 
25. Egg and sperm donation are often commercial enterprises where the donors are paid 
for their eggs or sperm. Maggie Jones, Donating Your Eggs, GLAMOUR MAGAZINE, July 1996 at 
168 (discussing the process). 
26. Similarly, the wife's egg could be extracorporeally fertilized by sperm from a donor. 
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method, an embryo created by the sperm and egg of one couple is do-
nated to another couple. 27 
Gestational surrogacl8 is another method of artificial insemination 
utilizing in-vitro fertilization. However, unlike the donor egg or donor 
embryo methods, the providers of the genetic materials must find a 
woman to gestate and give birth to their child and then release that child 
to them. The couple's egg and sperm are extracorporeally fertilized. The 
fertilized egg is implanted in the woman's uterus. The couple and the 
woman usually enter into an agreement providing for gestational surro-
gacy.29 
Gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT) and zygote intrafallopian 
transfer (ZIFT) are two additional methods of assisted reproduction. In 
the GIFT method, the sperm and egg are injected directly into the fimbri-
ated ends of the fallopian tubes and fertilization occurs in the woman's 
body.30 In the ZIFT method, the fertilized egg is injected directly into the 
fallopian tubes. 31 
In conjunction with in-vitro fertilization, the process of freezing 
(cryopreservation)32 sperm, 33 eggs and fertilized eggs (preembryos) has 
continued to expand and has further complicated the methods of artificial 
assisted reproduction. Gametes and embryos can be frozen and later 
27. CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 5, at 9. 
28. The surrogate in this arrangement is the "true" surrogate. 
29. CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 5, at 9; Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal 1993), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 206 (1993). In this case a married couple and a woman entered into an 
agreement providing for the couple's extracorporeally fertilized egg to be implanted in the 
woman's uterus for gestation. When the woman gave birth to the child, she was to release the 
child to the couple, the genetic parents. The gestational mother refused to release the child and 
litigation, the first of its kind, ensued. 
30. CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 5, at 99-100. 
31. Jd. at 101. 
32. This process of freezing suspends further development of the gamete or embryo. The 
freezing takes place in liquid nitrogen. After freezing, the frozen gametes and embryos are stored. 
G. David Ball, Cryopreservation of Embryos, 32 CLINICAL 0BSTET. & GYN 508 ( 1989)(providing 
a scientific discussion of the process). 
33. The use of frozen sperrn in artificial insemination has been available for a long time. 
In 1961, the astronauts were able to store semen in case space travel harmed their reproductive 
systems. Shaptro, supra note 8, at 234; Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 285 
(1993). 
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thawed for fertilization or for embryo implantation.34 Thus, posthumous 
reproduction is possible.35 
B. Rights Based Approach: the Concept of Autonomy 
Artificial assisted reproduction has developed rapidly, leaving the 
law to play catch-up so far as legal issues are concerned. Such legal is-
sues include: the parental status of the husband and the donor in artificial 
insemination,36 the validity and regulation of surrogacy contracts, 37 and 
in-vitro fertilization issues.38 
34 The combination of the types of births that may result seems endless. For example, 
births may take place years after the genetic parents are dead. Identical twins may be born years 
apart Different gestational mothers may give birth to identical twins. Grandmothers may gestate 
their grandchild. These technological advances both in assisted reproduction and in contraceptives 
and the legalization of abortion have led Professor Robertson boldly to write: "The decision to 
have or not have children is, at some important level, no longer a matter of God or nature, but 
has been made subject to human will and technological expertise. It has become a choice whether 
persons reproduce now or later, whether they overcome infertility, whether their children have 
certain genetic characteristics, or whether they use their reproductive capacity to produce tissue 
for transplant or embryos and fetuses for research." CIIILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 5, at 5. 
35. Posthumous reproduction includes the birth of a child conceived after the death of one 
or both of his or her genetic parents or from the implanting and gestating of an embryo after the 
death of one or both of the child's genetic parents. Professor Robertson would include a brain-
dead or comatose pregnant woman, who is kept on life support to allow the fetus to develop. John 
A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1050-51 (1994). 
36. Legislation has been enacted in many states to clarify that the husband of the wife who 
has been artificially inseminated by a sperm donor other than her husband (AID) is treated as the 
legal father of the child if he has consented. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (a) (1996); CAL Ctv. 
CODE§§ 7005(a), 7613(a) (West 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 19-4-106(1) (West 1996); IDAHO 
CODE§ 39-5405(3) (West 1996); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 40/3, § 3(a) (Smith-Hurd 1996); 
N.J. STAT ANN.§ 917-44(a) (West 1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 151.10l(a) (West 1996). 
Legislation has also been enacted in many states to clarify that the sperm donor in AID is 
legally not the father of the child unless the donor provides semen for his own wife. See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE§ 26-17-2l(b) (1996); CAL Clv. CODE§§ 7005(b), 7613(b) (West 1995); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN.§ 19-4-106(2)(West ]996); IDAHO CODE§ 39-5405(1) (West 1996); ILL ANN. STAT. 
ch. 750, para. 40/3, § 3(b) (Smith-Hurd 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 9:17-44(b) (West 1996); TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN.§ 151.10l(b) (West 1996). 
37. States are beginning to enact legislation to regulate surrogate contracts. See, e.g., ARIZ. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) (1996) (no person may enter into the formation of a surrogate 
parentage contract); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-401(4)(A)-(B) (1996) (definition of a surrogate 
parenting contract); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.13(5)-(7) (1996) (defines the terms associated with a 
gestational surrogacy contract); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (1996) ("A person . . shall 
not be a party to a contract ... which would compensate a woman for her artificial insemination 
and subsequent termination of parental rights to a child born as a result of that artificial 
insemination".); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B: 19(11) (1995) (a surrogate and the intended parents 
must receive genetic counseling); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-8:21 (1995) (the parties to a 
surrogacy contract must petition the court for a judicial preauthorization of the surrogacy 
arrangement); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 122 (West 1996) (surrogacy contracts are void because they 
are contrary to public policy); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie 1996) (regardless of the genetic 
relationships of all parties in a surrogacy contract, intended parents will be the parents of a child 
born to the surrogate). 
38. Many states now have legislation regulating aspects of in-vitro fertilization. LA. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 128 (1996) (qualifications of physicians who may perform in-vitro fertilization 
procedures); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 124 (1996) (the confidentiality of an in-vitro fertilization 
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Many have argued that artificial assisted reproduction law should be 
approached from a rights-based perspective. The concept of autonomy 
and self-determination should gird artificial reproduction law.39 These 
advocates contend that contract law should govern the parties involved in 
artificial reproduction.40 They further assert that artificial reproduction 
should be considered the equivalent of procreation-that it is part of pro-
creation, protected by the liberty clause ofthe Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. These advocates 
contend that the government should not intervene unless there is harm. 
However, these advocates' definition of harm is so narrowly defined that 
it would seldom be found. 41 Their definition of harm relies on the princi-
ple that existence is better than nonexistence. Therefore, there is no harm 
unless one can show that the child would be better off having not been 
born. As a result, few circumstances constitute harm--life is better than 
nonexistence. However, this approach overshadows both the welfare of 
children who are deliberately created and the bargaining strength of the 
parties.42 
III. POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION-A NOVEL SOCIETAL CONCEPT 
Among legal scholars addressing the issue of surrogate motherhood 
contracts, Professor Richard Barnes has argued that the best approach is 
patient will be maintained); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126 (1996) (ownership of an in-vitro fertilized 
human ovum; the Louisiana Civil Code recognizes the rights of in-vitro fertilization patients only 
if they express their identity); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 130 (1996) (duties of donors for in-vitro 
fertilization procedures; no compensation shall be paid or received); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 133 
(19%) (generally, an in-vitro fertilized ovum does not have inheritance rights); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 168-B:J(l)(e) (1995) (upon writing an agreement, an unmarried man is presumed to be 
the father of a child where he donates sperm for usc for in-vitro fertilization); N.H. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 168-!3.13 (1995) (eligibility of a woman who may undergo in-vitro fertilization); N.Y. 
DoM. REL. LAw§ 123(1)(b) (West 1996) (no person shall arrange a surrogate parenting contract 
for a fee unless it is payment for in-vitro fertilization services). 
39. Professor John A. Robertson is the most prominent advocate of this approach, using 
the term "procreative liberty". See generally, John A. Robertson, Embryos. Families, and 
Procreative Uberty: l11e Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939 (1986); 
John A. Robertson, In The Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Emb1yos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437 
( 1990); John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L. J. 1027 (1994 ); John A. 
Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom And The New Reproductive Technologies 
(1994)[hereinafter Children of Choice]; John A. Robertson, Liberalism And the Limits of 
Procreative Liberty A Response To My Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 233 (1995). 
40. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology And Intent-Based Parenthood: An 
Opportunity For Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 297 (1990). 
41. Children of Choice, supra note 5, at 41, 173-194. 
42. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (the intent of the parties governs 
the enforcement of the gestational surrogacy contract rather than the best interests of the child.); 
Ann MacLean Massie, Regulating Choice: A Constitutional Law Response To Professor 
Robertson's CHJLDRENOFCHOICE, 52 WASH & LEE L. REV. 135, 138 n.14 (citing various authors 
who note the interests of the would-be children become secondary). 
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to abandon analogies to existing doctrines, such as contract, probate, or 
gift law. Rather, the law of surrogate motherhood contracts should de-
velop as a novel question. This allows proper consideration of the numer-
ous moral, ethical, and public policy concerns it presents.43 His idea is 
appealing when approaching the issue of posthumous conception. Fur-
thermore, when considering that posthumous conception exists only be-
cause of modem advancements in science and technology, one better ap-
preciates Barnes' argument that analogies to historical areas of the law 
may result in the development of an inadequate doctrine. 
On the other hand, the fundamental element of posthumous concep-
tion, that a child may be born after the death of a parent, traditionally the 
father, is not new and has largely been accommodated in the law to that 
extent.44 Through coital reproduction, children may be conceived (or at 
least the sperm is in the mother's body even if conception has not liter-
ally occurred prior to death) and gestate prior to the death of the father. 
However, in posthumous reproduction, the fertilization occurs after the 
death of one or both of the genetic parents. This concept is novel and has 
not been adequately accommodated in the law.45 
Posthumous conception is more novel than allowing the implanting 
and gestating of thawed embryos after the death of the genetic parent or 
parents. Posthumous conception allows a child to be conceived after the 
death of either or both of the gamete providers. The gametes may be 
frozen for long periods of time, and then thawed when ready to be used 
for conception. While cryopreservation has not developed to accommo-
date the ready use of frozen ova over any extended time,46 the freezing of 
sperm is quite common in almost all instances of artificial insemination 
by donor.47 
Posthumous reproduction, therefore, raises fundamental societal 
questions that are novel in the law. May dead people reproduce offspring 
43. Richard L. Barnes, Delusion By Analysis. The Surrogate Mother Problem, 34 S.D. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1988/89). Professor Wadlington has also expressed a similar view. Walter Wadlington, 
Artificial Conception, 69 VA. L. REv. 465, 477 (1983). 
44. Common law recognizes posthumously-born children if they are born within 300 days 
of the death of the parent. This child is referred to as being "en ventre sa mere". lf a child is 
born within this time period, the common law considers the child as the child of the deceased 
parent and with all the protection that this child would have had if he or she had not been born 
posthumously. In almost all of these cases the deceased parent is the father. Mothers have died 
prior to the child's birth, but the death of the mother and the birth of the child arc almost 
simultaneous occurrences. For purposes of this article, the case of a brain-dead woman, who gives 
birth in that condition, is excluded and not counted as a posthumous conception case. 
45. See, supra notes 32 and 34. 
46. See, Christine A. Djalleta, Comment, A Twinkle In A Decedent's Eye: Proposed 
Amendments To The Uniform Probate Code In Light Of New Reproductive Technology, 67 TEMPLE 
L. REv. 335, 337 n.20 (1994). 
47. See, Robertson, supra note 35, at 1035. 
1] POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION 9 
through artificial reproduction? What is reproductive value to the dead 
person? Should families be purposely formed in this manner? Do the 
would-be children have any interests? If so, do their interests conflict 
with those of their genetic parents? Does posthumous reproduction inher-
ently generate social and economic issues beyond the private interests of 
those who are reproducing? For example, what are society's interests in 
the welfare of the after-born child? What is the status of the embryo, the 
sperm or ova? Who controls the embryo or the gamete? And finally, who 
should decide these questions? 
Posthumous conception complicates the issue and presents additional 
questions. What, for instance, are the interests of a dead person in posthu-
mous conception when that person will not participate in the procreative 
experience, except to donate genetic material? Experiences of concep-
tion, gestation, and child rearing are all absent. Unlike posthumous gesta-
tion of the embryo, not all of the genetic material of the would-be child is 
present when the person dies as conception has not yet taken place. There 
is no developing human life as there would be if the decedent had, in-
stead, left an embryo. Rather, there is only the potential for human life. 
The legal issues raised in these instances- the nature and scope of 
posthumous conception - are beyond the scope of contract, probate and 
personal property law. They are unhelpful in identifying the values and 
meaning derived from conception, gestation, rearing, and the genetic tie. 
Moreover, reproductive values such as the sanctity of life, respect for life, 
and the protection of life, are not the underlying values of contract, pro-
bate, and personal property law. 
For instance, even if gametes and embryos are considered to be prop-
erty, the issue of posthumous reproduction involves values that are differ-
ent from those underlying the values of property law. The underlying 
value of posthumous reproduction concerns the creation of human life, 
while the purpose of property law is the allocation and protection of 
property rights. In connection with probate law, there is more to posthu-
mous reproduction than just putting one's current affairs in order. Posthu-
mous reproduction is the opposite--affairs are not put in order and con-
sequences are created for others. Essentially, this is not an issue easily 
answered by analogies to traditional areas of the law; however, these 
same areas of the law may provide a framework to develop posthumous 
reproduction and posthumous conception doctrine. 
Some of this framework is provided by three cases dealing with the 
issue of the use of frozen sperm for posthumous conception. All of these 
cases are instructive as to the utility of analogy to contract, probate, and 
10 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 11 
personal property law.48 The first case, Parpalaix v. CECOS, 49 was de-
cided by a French court in 1984. A widow, who wanted to be artificially 
inseminated with her deceased husband's sperm, requested the sperm 
bank to release the sperm to her. Mr. Parpalaix, the husband, had made a 
single deposit of his sperm at the bank in 1981. He made the deposit with 
the understanding that his impending cancer treatment would cause his 
sterility. 50 The sperm bank refused to release the sperm to the widow be-
cause Mr. Parpalaix had left no instruction for the use of the sperm.51 
The widow and her in-laws eventually filed a lawsuit for the release 
of the sperm in the Tribunal de grande instance (the French court of orig-
inal jurisdiction). They alleged that as the natural heirs of Mr. Parpalaix, 
they became the owners of the sperm and that the sperm bank had 
breached its contract by refusing to tum over the sperm.52 The sperm 
bank argued 53 that it was only obligated to the donor since spem1 is the 
indivisible part of the body and thereby cannot be inherited absent ex-
press intent. 54 
The court found contract and property theory inapplicable. Rather, 
the cm:rt described the sperm as "the seed of life ... tied to the funda-
mental liberty of a human being to conceive or not to conceive."55 Based 
on this rationale, the court held that the disposition of the sperm must be 
decided by the person from whom it was drawn. The court ultimately 
found that Mr. Parpalaix intended to give the sperm to his wife so she 
could conceive their child. 56 
48. There are cases dealing with the issue of prisoner rights and posthumous conception. 
Courts in California and Virginia held that prisoners on death row, who wanted to store their 
sperm so that it might be used for posthumous conception, had no right to reproduce. See 
Katherine Bishop, Prisoners Sue To Be Allowed to Be Fathers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 5, 1992, ~ I, at 
14. Similarly, courts have held that prisoners had no right to provide sperm to artificially 
inseminate their wives while living. See Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (an 
inmate was denied habeas corpus relief to artificially inseminate his wife because the Bureau of 
P1isons' restriction of inmate procreation was related to the furthering of penological interest of 
gender equality). 
49. This case (Parpalaix v. Centre d'Etude et de Conservation du Sperme, Trib. gr mst 
Crctcil, Aug. 1984, Gagette du Pala1s [G.P.], Sept. 15, 1984, at II.) was reported In Shapiro, 
supra note 8. The California Court in deciding the second posthumous conception case relied on 
the facts in the French case as stated in that article. Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 
836, 20 Cal Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). 
50. Shapiro, supra note 8, at 229-30. 
51. ld at 229. 
52. ld at 230. 
53. The bank also argued (I) that its only legal obligation was to the husband under the 
deposit agreement, and (2) that depositing sperm was for therapeutic purposes to overcome male 
sterility, but giving birth was not a therapeutic matter. !d. at 231. 
54. !d. 
55. Jd. at 232. 
56. Jd. 
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The second case is Hecht v. Superior Court, 57 a 1993 California case. 
Prior to his death, William Kane stored sperm deposits at a California 
sperm bank. He executed an agreement with the bank to release the 
sperm only to him or his designee upon express written authorization. 
The agreement further provided that if he died, the bank was to release 
the sperm deposits to the executor of his estate. In a will executed shortly 
before his death, Kane named Deborah Hecht, his live-in girl friend of 
five years, as executor 58 and residuary legatee. Kane also made sperm 
deposits, and signed a release form, authorizing release of the sperm to 
Deborah Hecht and her physician. 59 However, since Kane never presented 
the release form to the sperm bank, the will controlled his probate prop-
erty. 
Kane's children by a previous marriage contested the will. At the 
children's request, the administrator filed a petition before the probate 
court claiming ownership of the sperm deposits. The petition presented 
three arguments. First, the will was invalid and they, as his sole heirs un-
der the California intestate succession law, were entitled to all of the 
sperm. Second, if their settlement agreement with Hecht was valid, they 
were entitled to eighty-per-cent of the sperm. Finally, they also argued 
that the comi should order the spern1 destroyed on public policy 
grounds. 60 Hecht responded by arguing that the sperm was not an estate 
asset because it had been gifted to her at the time of its deposit at the 
sperm bank. In the alternative, she argued that if it were an estate asset, 
either the will or the settlement agreement gave her the sperm.61 In es-
sence, the destruction of the sperm against her wishes would violate her 
rights of privacy and procreation under the federal and state constitu-
. tions.62 
Hecht appealed the probate court's order to destroy the sperm. The 
appellate court first determined whether the probate court had jurisdiction 
to enter such an order since the "power of the probate court extends only 
to the property of the decedent"63 as established by the legislature. The 
court determined that the California Probate Code defined probate prop-
erty as "anything that may be subject of ownership and includes both real 
and personal property and any interest therein."64 The court held that the 
donor of sperm has "an interest, in the nature of ownership, to the extent 
57. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). 
58. The record is unclear as to why she did not serve as the executor and a special 
administrator was appointed. Jd. at 277. 
59. See id. at 276. 
60. !d. at 278. 
61. !d. at 279 
62. ld 
63. !d. at 280. 
64. !d. at 281. 
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that he had decision-making authority as to the use of his sperm for re-
production. Such an interest is sufficient to constitute 'property' within 
the meaning of Probate Code § 62."65 The court held that Deborah Hecht 
would be entitled to the sperm if Kane's will was valid at trial. The court 
further held that because sperm is reproductive material, and thus, a 
unique type of 'property,' it declined to apply general personal property 
law.66 
The third case is Hall v. Fertility Institute of New Orleans,67 a 1994 
Louisiana case. Barry Hall began making deposits of his sperm in a 
sperm bank for preservation on advice from his physician about the ef-
fects that his pending chemotherapy would have on his fertility. These 
deposits were to be used at a later date to artificially inseminate Christine 
St. John. St. John began and then discontinued preparations for artificial 
insemination during the period in which deposits were being made. Prior 
to his death, Hall executed a formal written act of donation of the frozen 
sperm to St. John, pursuant to Louisiana law. 
The executrix of his will, his mother, sued the sperm bank for a de-
claratory judgment declaring either that Hall's sperm was probate prop-
erty or that the sperm should be destroyed. She also sued for injunctive 
relief to prevent the release of the sperm absent a court order. St. John 
intervened, claiming the sperm had already been gifted to her. The trial 
court eventually granted the executrix's motion and enjoined the release 
of the sperm to St. John or any attempt at fertilization pending further 
court orders. 
The court of appeals found that an inter-vivos gift of frozen sperm to 
a donee for the purpose of being artificially inseminated either during the 
donor's life or posthumously was not against public policy. However, the 
issue before the court was the appropriateness of the trial court's injunc-
tion. The court held that the injunction was proper because the trial court 
could reasonably conclude that the executrix had made out a prima facie 
case that the inter-vivos donation was invalid. If the decedent-donor was 
"competent and not under undue influence at the time the act was passed, 
the frozen semen is St. John's property, and she has full rights to its dis-
position."68 If he was incompetent, then the gift failed and the sperm 
would be probate property. 
Although the Hecht Court69 found that the probate court had jurisdic-
tion because of the property interest in Kane's frozen sperm, its rationale 
65. /d. at 283. 
66. !d. 
67. 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994). 
68. Hall, 647 So. 2d at 1351. 
69. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275. 
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was similar to that of the French court in Parpalaix. Both courts tied the 
spern1 donor's interest to the unique nature of sperm. The interest, which 
the California coure0 called "property," was the donor's decision-making 
authority over the use of the sperm for procreative purposes. In 
Parpalaix, 71 the Court did not strain to find an analogy to property law 72 
but, nevertheless, reached the same conclusion-that the issue was about 
posthumous procreative liberty. Both courts emphasized that general 
property law did not accommodate issues of procreative decision-mak-
mg. 
In Hall, the Louisiana Coure3 used the term "property" in reference 
to frozen sperm74 and held that the case would be decided by Louisiana 
gift law. The court did not note the uniqueness of sperm as did the courts 
in Hecht and Parpalaix. Rather, the Court simply accepted the notion that 
sperm was property and thus subject to gift law. In delineating the factors 
of donative intent, the Court focused on the purpose of sperm, though it 
had already stated that the issue of the constitutionality of artificial repro--
duction and the issue of posthumous reproduction were not present. 75 
Rather, the validity of the gift depended upon the donor's decision-mak-
ing authority over the use of the sperm for procreative purposes. 
As these three cases illustrate, contract, probate, or gift doctrines do 
not allow the judiciary to grapple with the fundamental issues of posthu-
mous conception. The courts only do what these doctrines allow them to 
do---'-to engage in a discussion about who has the right to make the deci-
sion about the use of the gamete and about the validity of the forum used 
for conveying the decision. A will, a contract, or an act of donation may 
be used as the instrument to make known the decision, but the substantive 
law is unhelpful in determining posthumous conception doctrine even if 
gametes are treated as property. The fundamental issues of posthumous 
conception concern human creation and its attending consequences. 
These consequences include those for the would-be child. 76 Therefore, 
70. !d. 
71 Shapiro, supra note 8. 
72. A more natural analogy would be to testamentary guardianship, especially since the 
cuur!';; rationale for its decision was based on its finding that the uniqueness uf sperm is its 
potential for human life. A will is often used to nominate a guardian for the decedent's children, 
that is, to provide a forum for this nomination. 
73. Hall. 647 So. 2d 1348. 
74. There are others, advocating that gametes should be perceived as property. See. <'.g., 
William Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, And Other Valuables: The Need To Recognize Property 
Rights In Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693 (1995); Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Note, 
Personalizing Personalty: Toward A Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209 
(1990). 
75. Hall, 647 So. 2d at 1351. 
76. See Part lll, Section B (I) for a discussion of the principles and policies underlying the 
concept of posthumous conception. 
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posthumous conception should be approached as a novel societal con-
cept: a concept which requires formation of its own doctrine rather than a 
reliance on analogies to doctrines of property and contract Jaw. 
IV. POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION-PRIVATE 77 OR PUBLIC MATTER? 
How should society deal with posthumous conception? Should the 
issue of posthumous conception be left to the individual to decide with-
out state interference? If the benchmark for the need to set legal norms is 
when a personal decision raises troublesome moral and ethical issues 
which become a matter of public morality and ethics, then in the case of 
posthumous conception that time has come. 78 
If posthumous conception requires its own legal doctrine,79 then the 
framework for the doctrine should begin with the United States Constitu-
tion. The Constitution restricts government interference with an individ-
ual's fundamental rights unless there is a compelling interest to do so. 
Such interference must be closely tailored to accomplish that interest. 80 
Thus, built into the concept of fundamental rights is the normative value 
of government neutrality unless there is a compelling interest because 
these matters are private. Society must tolerate the individual's practice 
of a fundamental right even if such practice is offensive to the majority. 
If it is not a fundamental right, however, the government has greater dis-
cretion in deciding whether or not to interfere. 
A. The Constitution and The Right to Procreate 
The Supreme Court has addressed few cases directly dealing with 
the affirmative right to procreate as compared with the right not to pro-
create. However, that right to procreate is arguably a fundamental right 
77. The regulation of artificial ass1sted reproduction has largely been left to the private 
sector. For example, the artificial insemination statutes usually focus on the status of the child and 
on the biological or legal father, not on regulation. See supra note 36. Only after surrogacy 
motherhood became quite controversial (especially after several high profile media cases) have 
some states enacted statutes banning or condoning certam surrogacy contracts. See supra note 37. 
The private sector is the principal regulator of the various aspects of in-vitro fertilization. Peters, 
.iupra note 2, at n.19. 
78. The law should detennine the legality and clarify the procedures for posthumous 
conc·ept1on, especially if one defines moral issues as ·'those in which different values and dut1es 
of persons directly involved in the decision conflict" and defines ethical issues as "those that 
extend beyond the immediate situation to include implications of an individual's choice on a 
larger group of people." John C. Fletcher, Moral Problems And Ethical Issues In Prospective 
Human Gene Therapy, 69 VA. L. REv. 515, 515 (1983). 
79. Religion, morality, and ethics may be the underpinnings of legal doctrine, but they have 
no legally-binding force unless they become Jaw. 
80. Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 J U.S. 479 ( 1965). 
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after examining two groups of cases. In the group concerning the right 
not to procreate, the affirmative right to procreate is implied. In Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 81 the Court identified a right of privac/2 protecting a mar-
ried couple's access to contraceptives. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,8' the Court 
extended that right to unmarried people, stating that "If the right of pri-
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to 
be free of unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. "84 
In Carey v. Population Services International, 85 the Court upheld a mi-
nor's right of access to contraceptives and affirmed that such access was 
essential to the decision as to whether to conceive a child. 86 
In Roe v. Wade, 87 the Court extended the right of privacy to include a 
woman's right to abortion. 88 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 89 the Court 
reaffirmed a woman's right to abortion prior to viability (although the 
three majority justices in this plurality opinion used an undue burden 
standard instead of Roe's trimester framework). Casey recognized again 
that the "law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relat-
ing to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing and education."90 
In addition to Supreme Court cases directly addressing the issues sur-
rounding reproductive rights, there have been a number of cases indi-
rectly or implicitly addressing procreative liberty. Beginning in the early 
1920s, the Supreme Court recognized the right "to marry, establish a 
home·, and bring up children."91 Later, in Skinner v. Oklahoma. 9" the 
Court described the right to marry and procreate as basic civil rights 
81. /d. 
82. The Supreme Court identified the right of privacy in Griswold as a constitutionally 
protected right even though this right is not explicitly found in the Constitution. The majority and 
concuning opinions relied on the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments in order 
to find a general right of privacy applicable to the federal and state governments. Later cases 
developing the scope of the right of privacy have relied on the liberty provision of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Such rights as access to contraceptives, 
parenting, procreating have been identified as being under this privacy umbrella. See supra note 
4. 
83. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
84. /d. at 453. 
85 431 us. 678 (1977). 
86. /d. at 685-688. 
87. 410 u.s 113 (1973). 
88. The court held the right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's derision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." /d. at 183. 
89 505 U.S 833 (1992). 
90. /d. at 851. 
91. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 {1923). 
92. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
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"fundamental to the very survival of the race.'m In Stanley v. Illinois,94 
the Court held that the right to conceive and raise one's children is an 
essential civil right, basic to humankind. According to the Court, this 
right is more important than property rights.95 The Court has also directly 
affirmed that the right to marry is a fundamental right. 96 Based upon 
cases such as these, one may reasonably conclude that the law views pro-
creation as a fundamental right. 97 
The Supreme Court, however, has not decided a case directly deter-
mining whether artificially assisted reproduction is an aspect of the fun-
damental right to procreate. Is artificial reproduction, therefore, constitu-
tionally equivalent to coital procreation?98There are a number of similari-
ties. The object of both is usually to produce genetically-related off-
spring. Professor John A. Robertson has found support in the Supreme 
Court's decisions for the proposition that the desire to make reproductive 
choices is to find self-fulfillment.99 Producing genetically-related off-
spring generally helps people define themselves. 100 It creates an enduring 
bond with the next generation. There is often great satisfaction in creating 
children who resemble themselves. 101 
Nevertheless, traditional procreation differs fundamentally from 
artificially-assisted procreation. The affirmative aspect of procreation 
includes conception, gestation, birth, and rearing offspring. 102 In coital 
procreation the persons providing the gametes are involved in concep-
tion, gestation, and giving birth, with the female exclusively involved in 
gestation and giving birth. The gamete providers usually rear the off-
spring. Assisted reproduction has, however, changed the exclusivity of 
the gamete providers in conception, gestation, and giving birth. With this 
development, procreation can now be broken down into its various parts. 
Furthermore, persons, besides the gamete providers, may be used to col-
laborate in the process of procreation. 
In artificial assisted reproduction, the intimate decision of choosing 
to procreate necessarily involves others. This involvement and the issues 
93. !d. at 541. 
94. 405 u.s. 645 (1972). 
95. !d. at 651. 
96. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967). 
97. As already discussed in Part lll, Section A, the right not to procreate is a fundamental 
right and falls within the umbrella of the right of privacy. It includes the right to use 
contraceptives and the right to abortion. 
98. See Massie, supra note 42 (concluding that assisted reproduction is not equivalent to 
coital reproduction). 
99. See, e.g, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 5, at 24. 
l 00. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L REV. 209, 211 ( 1995). 
101. !d. at 215. 
102. This definition implicitly includes the voluntary choosing of a mate and the mate's 
consent. 
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relating to their involvement critically distinguish coital and assisted re-
production. In fact, everyone involved may have conflicting values, inter-
ests, and duties. Accordingly, the state has legitimate interests in defining 
the various relationships between the participants, in defining their rights 
and duties, and most importantly, in defining their relationship to there-
sulting child. 
Artificial reproduction involving a couple providing its own gametes, 
gestation, and child rearing is probably equivalent to traditional procre-
ation. The only intrusion by third parties are the technology providers. In 
the case of in-vitro fertilization, if the couple is married, the right of pri-
vacy in the context of marital intimacy would likely apply under the 
holding of Griswold. 103 If the couple is unmarried, 104 the cases of 
Eisenstadt 105 and Carey 106 would most likely be construed to extend arti-
ficial conception to them. Justice Brennan's strong dicta in Eisenstadt, 
arguing that access to contraceptives went beyond the importance of the 
marital relationship to the individual, 107 was directly affirmed in Carey. 108 
These decisions, however, were in the context of preventing conception. 
Although there are similarities between traditional and assisted repro-
duction, assisted reproduction does not have the same heightened consti-
tutional protection as does procreation. By definition, assisted reproduc-
tion requires collaborators. It removes reproduction from the private 
realm of the progenitors, and includes others who may have competing 
inte_rests. Thus, artificially assisted reproduction, like adoption, requires 
greater state involvement. 
Even if the Supreme Court upholds assisted reproduction as an aspect 
of the fundamental right to procreate, would it extend to posthumous re-
production, and specifically to posthumous conception? 109 Several issues 
must be examined when considering this question. First, do the dead have 
any rights, constitutional or otherwise? Historically, the law has recog-
nized freedom of testation, limited usually by the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities as to how long the decedent may control the property after death. 
103. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
104. The Supreme Court has protected the traditional view of family under the prevailing 
standard of determining fundamental rights: deeply rooted in history and tradition. In Michael H. 
v. Gerald D. , 491 U.S. 110 (1989), the married couple was protected from intrusion by the 
biological father who wanted to assert parental rights of his biological child born to the wife 
during her marriage. Under this standard the right of an unmarried couple to procreate is not 
deeply rooted in this country's history and tradition. 
105. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
106. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
107. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
108. 431 U.S. 678, 685-88 (1977). 
109. There is always the slight possibility that in traditional procreation that conception may 
occur after the death of the male, but the sperm would have already been deposited through the 
sexual act while the decedent was alive. 
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Contracts and trusts executed while living will be enforced after death. 
The decedent has decision-making authority regarding the guardianship 
of his or her child if there is no one else with legal parental responsibility. 
Decisions as to what should be done with one's property and guardian-
ship of children after death are certainly foreseeable as a freedom that a 
decedent might have and use while living, and which the state will imple-
ment. 
As a general rule, the scope of testamentary freedom is within the 
state's domain, and is not a fundamental right. 110 If one follows the ratio-
nale in Hecht 111 that posthumous conception is a property interest within 
the jurisdiction of the probate court, then the right to make the decision is 
not a fundamental right, requiring heightened scrutiny. Such a rationale 
allows the state greater discretion to regulate the decision. 
A second issue to consider is whether technology creates rights? 
Where technology makes possible what was impossible in the past, does 
this give rights to the dead, by changing the definition of a right that was 
once only for the living? In other words, is posthumous conception an 
aspect of procreation, even when we know that posthumous conception 
presents only the potential for conception? 
A final issue to consider is whether posthumous conception is as im-
portant to the donor as reproduction is to the living. Is the value of repro-
duction such that it should be constitutionally protected, with little inter-
ference by the state? Arguably, posthumous conception would give 
meaning, identity, and value to the decedent by giving the autonomy to 
decide and in the genetic tie. The decedent experiences none of the mean-
ing obtained from conception, gestation, and parenting except for provid-
ing the gamete. If the gamete is an ovum, the woman gestating may have 
equal interests in parenting the child as the living sperm provider would 
have. 
An argument for heightened constitutional protection for posthumous 
conception is, therefore, less warranted than one for posthumous repro-
duction where fertilization takes place prior to the death of a parent. At 
the least, the embryo represents a stage in the development of human life 
- even if there is disagreement about what an embryo is. All genetic 
make-up is present in the embryo. Conversely, in posthumous concep-
tion, there is a mere isolated gamete with the potential for human life. 
The decedent dies without knowing if conception will ever occur. In 
II 0. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 48 I U.S. 705 (1987) (the U.S. Supreme Court, while 
interpreting the escheat provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, hinted that the 
complete abolition of descent and devise may be a taking under the Constitution). 
111. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). 
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posthumous conception, the ultimate value for the decedent must be the 
genetic tie. 
The desire to have offspring is often a very powerful force. 112 The 
genetic tie is a form of immortality and connects the generations. For the 
living, the genetic tie also brings the opportunity to know and rear the 
child. "It may inspire an intimate bond between a parent and child." 113 
The dead will never be able effectively to cultivate such a bond. 114 The 
genetic tie for the decedent is solely bound in the possibility of leaving a 
"piece of yourself in the world" 115 through the would-be child. 11That 
possibility does not rise to the level of procreation when there is only a 
lone gamete. 
After having considered these issues, it seems clear that posthumous 
conception is not a fundamental right. 117 The rights of the dead have, his-
torically, been limited to settling their estates. Extending the right to con-
ceive posthumously would be constitutionally unsound because posthu-
mous conception is not procreation in any meaningful way. The only real 
value of posthumous conception to the decedent is the genetic tie. No 
constitutional right should be afforded the genetic tie unless there is 
meaningful procreation. Leaving a gamete behind, which may or may not 
be used posthumously, is not procreation. 
B. Developing Posthumous Conception Doctrine 
1. Principles and Policies Underlying Posthumous Conception Doctrine 
A community-oriented approach may be taken to develop posthu-
mous conception doctrine if posthumous conception is not limited by a 
fundamental rights doctrine. 118 This section examines important princi-
112. Some ascribe this desire to nature. Roberts, supra note 100, at 215-16. 
113. !d. at 211. 
I 14. In the Hecht case, Mr. Kane was probably trying to forge such a bond in his letter to 
his posthumous children. !d. at 211. See also infra note 129. 
115. This phrase is used as the title of an article describing the use of cryopreservation for 
the later implantation of the human embryo. James Lieber, A Piece Of Yourself In The World, THE 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1989 at 76. 
116. In one sense it is ironic for us to think of ourselves as unique because this thinking 
is less true in reality than in theory since most of our genes vis-a-vis one another are more similar 
than dissimilar. 
117. Professor Robertson agrees that it is unlikely that posthumous conception is a 
fundamental right. Robertson, supra note 35, at 1035-1045 (discussing the constitutionality of the 
posthumous use of frozen sperm). 
118. Other writers advocate this approach to all assisted artificial reproduction. See, e.g., 
Massie, supra note 42; Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice. Procreative Liberty, and the Limits of 
Liberal Theory: Robertson's Children of Choice, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY I 005 ( 1995). 
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ples and policies that should be considered in developing posthumous 
conception doctrine. 
The rights119 and protection of the would-be child are compelling 
public and social policy interests which should be considered when de-
veloping posthumous conception doctrine. Although no child has a right 
to be conceived, 120once born, a child does have a right to a minimum 
quality of life. 121 Parents have both a moral and a legal obligation 12io 
provide a minimum quality of life for the child since they are the child's 
natural guardians. 123 If parents do not provide for the child's welfare, the 
state has a duty of care to protect the child under its parens patriae au-
thority.124 If the parents are already dead, then the state has a greater duty 
to care for that child. In the case of posthumous conception, the child is 
either partially orphaned or orphaned at birth. Even a parent of a partially 
orphaned child, who was not posthumously conceived, may not be in a 
position to provide for the child without the state's assistance. 
Furthermore, the state has made certain policy decisions that promote 
a child's opportunity to achieve a minimum quality of life. For example, 
one of the purposes for the social security system is to provide survivor-
ship benefits for the dependent children of a deceased parent because the 
child still needs to be maintained. Such laws may not protect children 
who are conceived posthumously. Accordingly, the state does have a le-
gitimate state interest to regulate posthumous conception to ensure the 
\Vould-be child's right to a minimum quality of life. 
Moreover, the community has an interest in protecting the would-be 
child from being treated as an object or a chattel if traditional gift, pro-
bate or contract law is applied to the decedent's gamete. 125 If the donee 
(such as Ms. Hecht) dies after having received the gamete but prior to 
conception, then the gamete would be part of the donee's estate and pass 
1 19. The unconceived child's rights are contingent upon his or her birth. See Peters, supra 
note 2, at 500-501 (discussing rights of the unconccived in connection with the common law's 
recognition of some prenatal injuries). 
120. A child does not have a right to be conceived. That decision is within the control of 
parents. The Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that there was no right 
to he hom within the first trimester after conception. 
121. Peters, .1upra note 2, at 521, gives a comprehensive discussion of the right to a 
minimum quality of life and the right to nonexistence; Massie, supra note 42, at 145 raises a 
similar concern that more weight should be placed on the interests of the would-be child. 
122. This moral and legal obligation is an established principle of Anglo-American law. I 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *434-37. 
123. A 11 states appoint the parents as the natural guardians of their children and impose a 
duty of support. 
124. See Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY 
u ]lJ5 (197R). 
125. Several commentators raise concerns about artificial reproduction because of the fear 
that it will lead to the commoditication of children. See, e.g, Maura A. Ryan, The Argument For 
Unlimited Procreative Liberty: a Feminist Critique, 20 HASTrNGS CENTER RFP. 6 (Jul!Aug 1990). 
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to the donee's heirs or devisees. Such transmission would undermine our 
society's deeply rooted tradition of the respect for the sanctity of life. 
Consequently, the gamete may lose its symbolism of human life, and 
merely become fungible personal property. The donee's successor may 
use the gamete for reproduction with a gamete from any other person, a 
consequence never intended by the donor. 
An aspect of commodification may be part of traditional procreation 
because persons, more often than not, want offspring as a means to their 
own ends of happiness and self-fulfillment. It is important, however, to 
differentiate between the living and the dead. The child is not just an ob-
ject created from the parents' genetic material. Implicit in the right to 
procreate is the duty of responsibility to the child. The child needs a liv-
ing parent to nurture him or her. The dead cannot nurture. 
Although posthumous conception is not a fundamental right, the au-
tonomy of the individual to make posthumous decisions may be of great 
value to the decedent. The public policy of promoting self-determination 
and self-happiness is an important and vibrant one in our law. However, 
it is only one of the many important, sometimes competing, policies. Pro-
fessor Robertson has argued that procreative liberty is central to personal 
meaning, dignity, and identity. 126 This argument may be true for the liv-
ing, but it is surely not the same for the dead. Posthumous conception 
will give personal meaning, dignity, and identity to the decedent only to 
the extent that the decedent, while living, may experience personal mean-
ing, dignity, and identity from knowing that posthumous conception may 
occur. The state's interest in the well-being of this would-be child should 
tip the scales in favor of considering posthumous conception as a public 
matter. 
It is an important public policy to enable infertile couples to have the 
choice to procreate if it gives them personal meaning, dignity, and iden-
tity. There is no similar compelling reason for posthumous conception, 
however, unless infertility or the possibility of infertility prevented con-
ception during life. In Hecht, 127 and possibly in Hall, 128 there seems to be 
no reason why conception could not have occurred during Mr. Kane's 
life. His desire to have a child conceived posthumously appeared to be 
motivated by his own personal folly. 129 
126. Robertson, supra note 35, at 1041. 
127. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). 
128. 64 7 So. 2d 1348. 
129. On October 21, 1991, he writes to his unconceived children: "I address this to my 
children, because, although I have only two, Everett and Katy, it may be that Deborah will decide 
- as I hope she will - to have a child by me after my death. I've been assiduously generating 
frozen sperm samples for that eventuality. If she does, then this letter is for my posthumous 
offspring, as well, with the thought that I have loved you in my dreams, even though I never got 
to see you born." 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 275, 277. 
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The living have more rights than the dead for the reason that the liv-
ing make and enforce the rules for the dead. Limiting the dead hand is 
usually discussed in connection with how much power society should 
allow the dead to exert over property after death. This limitation has been 
justified on the basis that "[t]he welfare of society demands that the law 
should set limits to the power of the hand of the dead to control human 
affairs." 130 This justification applies to how much control the living 
should allow the dead over posthumous conception. The purpose of post-
humous conception is to produce offspring whom the living-not the 
dead- will gestate and rear. Society has an interest in controlling the 
dead hand when an individual's decision will affect the living to the same 
extent as posthumous conception. Furthermore, decisions that may seem 
to be irresponsible if made by the living are often protected from state 
interference. If they are requested in a will, the law will not enforce them. 
It is impossible to hold the dead accountable for their actions.l3l They are, 
therefore, not deterred by their own self-interest. 
The state has an interest in family formation although the policy of 
family autonomy and the constitutional right of privacy in the context of 
family formation deter state involvement. On the other hand, that deter-
rence is decreased in the area of posthumous conception since a funda-
mental right is not involved. 132 Even if posthumous conception were a 
fundamental right, the state's interest is compelling because this novel 
technology may fundamentally change the family, a basic unit of soci-
ety.133 Although alternative families 134 may become the norm as opposed 
to the traditional intact family in the very near future, 135 these families 
were not purposefully created with conception occurring after the death 
of at least one of the parents. Therefore, determining whether society 
should sanction the intentional creation of partially orphaned or fully 
130. Austin Wakeman Scott, Control of Property By the Dead, 65 U PA. L. REv. 527, 527 
(1917). 
131. Orrin K. McMurray, Liberty of Testation And Some Modern Limitations Thereon, 14 
Nw. U. L. REV. 96 (1919-1920); Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1975). 
132. See discussion supra Part Ill, Section A. 
133. D. Kelly Weishberg, Alternative Family Structures and the Law, THE FAMILY 
COORDINATOR, Oct. 1975, at 549 (noting the importance of the traditional family unit for the 
survival of the state). 
134. E.g., communes, unmanied couples, single parent families, stepfamilies, gay and lesbian 
families. 
135. Joan D. Atwood and Renee Zebersky, Using Social Construction 77zerapy with the REM 
Family, 24 J. OF Drv. & REMARR. 133 (1995) (remarried (REM) families will outnumber all other 
forms by 2000); Shoshana Grinwald, Communication-Family Characteristics: A Comparison 
Between Stepfamilies (Formed After Death or Divorce) and Biological Families, 24 J. OF DIV. & 
REMARR. I 83 (1995)(the stepfamily will be the dominant family structure by 2000). 
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orphaned children is not a decision that should be left as private when 
conception has not occurred. 
The courts, both in Hecht 136 and in Hall, 137 found no merit in the ob-
jections of the siblings of the would-be child who wanted no other sib-
lings to be posthumously conceived. Mr. Hall's only child declared that 
the prospect of a posthumous blood relative made him emotionally upset, 
embarrassed, and angered. 138 Mr. Kane's two children raised similar ob-
jections.139 Both courts may have ignored these concerns based on the 
notion that parents do not consult with their children about procreation 
anyway. In the case of posthumous conception, however, the state's usual 
strong interest in family harmony should not be so easily cast aside. The 
family has already been disrupted with the decedent's death. Now, the 
decedent is deliberately conceiving a child and will never experience any 
of the interactions, good or bad, between the two sets of children and will 
never be in a position to help the older children adjust to the arrival of a 
new sibling. It is doubtful that such a disruption to family harmony is 
justified as a matter of policy if the decedent could have procreated dur-
ing life. 
The donee's procreative rights to use the decedent's gamete is also an 
important part of the discourse on developing posthumous conception 
doctrine. It raises the question of whether the procreative rights of the 
living extend to procreating with the dead. Procreative rights of the liv-
ing, even as a constitutionally protected right, are not always a private 
matter. The law prohibits, for example, rape and incest 140 A donee's right 
to procreate with the dead raises the same public policy concerns as when 
evaluating this issue from the perspective of the donor, except that the 
donee would experience most of the meaning of procreation. The funda-
mental issue of the welfare of the would-be child, however, prevents the 
donee's interest from remaining a private matter. 
On the other hand, the autonomy of the donee in choosing to procre-
ate is important for self-determination and self-happiness and the fulfill-
ment of the desire to have genetically-related children. For the donee, to 
have a child who is genetically-related to the donor may ease the grieving 
process and aid in the donee's adjustment to life without the donor. The 
child may continue the "presence" of the donor in the life of the donee. 
The living parent may still achieve self-happiness and self-fulfillment 
with the decedent despite death. Without posthumous conception, a 
136. 20 Cal Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). 
137. 647 So. 2d 1348 (1994). 
138. !d. at 1350 
139. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 279 ("prevent additional emotional, psychological and 
t1nancial stress on those family members already in existence"). 
140. Peters, supra note 2, at 489. 
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widow would not have had a child. 141 Posthumous conception viewed in 
this way may appear as a gift from the dead to the living. 142 
The autonomy of the donee in choosing with whom to procreate 143 is 
also an important interest with respect to limiting government regulations 
as to who may procreate. Posthumous conception doctrine may balance 
these interests, but the welfare of the would-be child is the most impor-
tant of the interests. In order to ensure the welfare of the child, the donor 
and donee must be intimately known to one another and would have con-
ceived the child while the donor lived. 144 Similarly, then, the donor must 
have intended to procreate posthumously and must have conveyed that 
mtent while living. 
In both Parpalaix 145 and in Hall, 146 the courts held that the donor's 
intent was a necessary requirement for posthumous conception. Accord-
ingly, the harvesting of gametes from dead bodies at the request of an-
other must be abandoned. 147 Such harvesting without the decedent's con-
sent violates the decedent's right, while living, to choose not to have chil-
dren.148 
In summary, when considering the various principles and policies 149 
underlying posthumous conception, providing a minimum quality of life 
for the child emerges as the primary concern. This concern outweighs the 
interest of self-determination and happiness of the decedent or the donee. 
At a minimum, society has an interest in ensuring that the would-be child 
has at least an adult to parent the child and that existing law does not hin-
141. See, e.g., supra note 7. Ms. Hart is quoted, "I have always thought death was so 
final .. there are deals to be made, you can't fix it. This time I thought, well, death scored one 
point and we scored one, too." Ellen Goodman, The Law vs. New Fact of Life, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 26, 1995 (Op. Ed.), at 13. 
142. See, e.g, !d. 
143. A renowned historian writes the following in her memoir about having a child with her 
husband as opposed to adopting a child. "I wasn't interested in adopting children. It wasn't the 
experience of caring for adorable infants and toddlers I wanted. It was a much more primitive 
desire to produce the combination of my genetic material and John's." JILL KER CONWAY, TRUE 
NORTH 133 (Vintage Books ed. I 994). 
144. Posthumous conception as explored in this article does not include the issue of 
anonymous donors whose gametes are stored in gamete banks. Anonymous donors do not intend 
to procreate posthumously. They have no intent to have a genetic tie with the child or be 
responsible for the child. 
145. Shapiro, supra note 8. 
146. 647 So. 2d 1348. 
147. There are a few reported instances in which fresh sperm has been harvested from the 
body of a dead person at the request of his widow. Maggie Gallagher, About Sperm: The Ultimate 
Deadbeat Dads, NEWSDAY, Feb. I, 1995, at A28. 
148. See Part III, Section A (discussing Supreme Court cases dealing with the right not to 
procreate). 
149. In his comments to this author, Professor Michael Newsom has suggested that 
posthumous conception doctrine should be examined from an analysis of relationships. Does the 
living still have a protected right in the relationship despite the death of the other partner so that 
posthumous conception is an aspect of that right? 
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der, but for the sake ofthe child's birth, his or her chances to a minimum 
quality of life. 
2. Shaping Posthumous Conception Doctrine: Using the Principle 
Of A Minimum Quality of Life 
The overriding principle that should shape posthumous conception 
doctrine is the protection of this class of children by providing them with 
at least a minimum quality of life at birth. This principle is equivalent to 
the minimum traditional best interests of the child standard, which courts 
have used in protecting parental rights from state interference. The mini-
mum standard requires that the child not be harmed. 150 This principle re-
quires that the class of posthumously-conceived children be provided 
with a quality of life close to that of the traditional posthumously-born 
class of children. Unlike the traditional class, however, the threshold for 
harm is more acute because conception itself may be harmful unless the 
state has intervened and has already established rules governing the entire 
concept of posthumous conception. 151 At a minimum, this standard re-
quires that at the child's birth, a responsible parent be in place, ready to 
care for the child. 
The child's birth would be comparable to the traditional 
posthumously-born child where the father has died. 152 The mother would 
be in place to care for the child. The issue is more complicated with post-
humous conception with a donated ovum because the gestating mother is 
not the biological mother. Whether the gestating mother has parental 
rights is another issue. Nevertheless, there is at least one adult, either the 
father or the gestating mother, who would be in place at birth to rear the 
child. 
The selection of the child's other biological parent should not be left 
entirely at the decedent's discretion, though it may be given much defer-
ence. If posthumous conception can be aligned with traditional posthu-
mous birth, the collective welfare of such children is better assured. The 
decedent's widow or widower would be the most desirable donee. In 
Hecht, 153 the court upheld the decedent's choice of his live-in girlfriend. 
The court found that it was not against the public policy of California for 
an unmarried person to be artificially inseminated since the law already 
150. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (determining the standard of 
proof to terminate parental rights). 
151. Establishing posthumous conception doctrine may be better approached from the 
legislature enacting a comprehensive statute rather than by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis. 
152. The Hecht court rejected the argument that California had a state policy against the 
formation of single-parent families. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 286. 
153. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (19'l3 ). 
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allowed it. Similarly, in Hall, 154 the court found it was not against the 
public policy of Louisiana for an unmarried person to be artificially 
inseminated. The culture and morals of society have changed to the ex-
tent that unmarried couples are usually not completely stigmatized. More 
importantly, in today's society, legal discrimination against children of 
unmarried parents is greatly reduced. 155 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court would probably construe 
Eisenstadt 156 and Care/ 57 as extending the Equal Protection Clause to 
protect unmarried persons, such as Deborah Hecht, to participate in post-
humous conception if a surviving spouse is allowed such participation. 
This approach is strengthened by the fact that single people are not ex-
cluded from the adoption process. Therefore, in the case of the unmarried 
couple, posthumous conception doctrine should require that during their 
lives they would have established more than a casual relationship. 158 
Ideally, the selection of the child's other biological parent should not 
be extended beyond the choices set forth in Parpalaix 159 and Hecht. 160 
First, the use of collaborators should occur only in the case where an 
ovum is the gamete in question. This limitation will minimize interests 
that other collaborators might assert. 161 Second, these selections should 
approximate the conception choices that the decedent would have made 
while living. The would-be child should also be born approximately in 
the appropriate generation. Finally, limiting the choice of the designee, as 
in Hecht 162 and Parpalaix, 163 helps ensure that the child will have an op-
portunity to learn about the deceased parent. The quest for knowledge 
about one's biological link has been illustrated by the experiences of 
some adult adoptees. 164 The posthumously-conceived child may have a 
similar desire. 
154. 647 So.2d 1348 (1994). 
155. Since 1968, more than thirty United States Supreme Court cases have dealt with the 
issue of the status of illegitimacy. Illegitimacy is a suspect classification, requiring a heightened 
standard of review. 
156. 405 u.s. 438 (1972). 
157. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
158. See also Sheri Gilbert, Note, Fatherhood From The Grave: An Analysis Of Postmortem 
Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 554 (1993). 
159. Shapiro, supra note 8. 
160. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). 
161. Even if the decedent is married, the selection should not be extended beyond the 
surviving spouse, including an infertile spouse, because of the interests that the collaborators might 
assert. 
162. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). 
163. Shapiro, supra note 8. 
164. Marshall D. Schechter & Doris Bertocci, The Meaning of the Search, THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF ADOPTION ( 1990). 
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The issues of the selection and the donee's fitness were not seriously 
considered in either Parpalaix165 or Hecht. 166 The donees in the respective 
cases were a widow and a single person who had established a five-year 
committed relationship. The law assumes that cases such as these are ap-
propriate for the collective welfare of the living. It seems the Hecht court 
did not realize the ramifications of its decision giving the probate court 
jurisdiction over the decedent's decision-making authority regarding the 
disposition of the sperm. Suppose, for example, Ms. Hecht had died be-
fore she had used the sperm. Would her estate be entitled to the sperm? 
Similarly, if the will had been found to be invalid, would the sperm have 
passed intestate? Could Ms. Hecht's or Mr. Kane's successors use the 
sperm for reproduction? These problems reveal that only the donee 
should be able to use the donor's gamete for the purpose of reproduction. 
The gamete would not become part of the donee's estate for contract, 
probate, or gift purposes. Furthermore, posthumous conception doctrine 
should clarify the method by which the donor conveys that he or she in-
tends the gametes in question be used for reproduction. Such clarification 
will not, however, eliminate all delays because the validity of the method 
used to convey intent may become an issue. 167 
The fitness of the designee is also a consideration. 168 Such consider-
ation of a future parent is not unprecedented when adoption is at issue. 
Because conception has not occurred, the would-be child's right to a min-
imum quality of life is analogous to the state's concern for an adopted 
child to have a minimum quality of life. If the designee is not fit to par-
ent, an unconceived child is not harmed if he or she is not born. In deter-
mining the harm at issue, some have argued that the test of never being 
born for the unconceived is not comparable to the test of never being 
born for a living child. 169 When courts have had to determine if being 
born is an injury in wrongful life cases, or how to determine damages in 
such cases, 170 the courts have used the comparison between life and never 
having been born. No harm is usually found because life is better than 
nonexistence. The nonexistence test is off-point when applied to uncon-
165. Shapiro, supra note 8. 
166. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). 
167. See, e.g., Hall, 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994)(raising the issue as to whether 
the act of donation of the frozen sperm was valid). 
168. At a minimum the decedent and the donee should not be related so that the child 
would be born from an incestuous relationship. The donee should be emotionally and 
psychologically fit for parenthood. 
169. Peters, supra note 2, at 536-547. 
170. These cases are negligence cases. The child's conception or birth could have been 
prevented, but for the doctor's negligence. See Peters, supra note 2, at 497-506 (1989). 
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ceived children. For the living child, death is the alternative to never be-
ing born; but, death is not the alternative for the unconceived. 171 
After considering the above discussion about the donee and the prin-
ciple of providing the minimum quality of life for the would-be child, 
there seems to be no important argument for posthumous conception if 
the potential living biological parent refuses to parent or will not properly 
parent the child. Producing children for the sake of the genetic tie is an 
irresponsible decision. The decedent should also be limited to a single 
donee and a maximum number of children. Some may argue that since 
there is no regulation over anonymous donors in artificial insemination as 
to the number of donees and to the number of children they may con-
ceive, why should there be a limit to the number of children that one may 
posthumously conceive? Unfortunately, artificial insemination has devel-
oped without state guidance in connection with the number of children 
any one donor may create. Such regulation may be inherently difficult to 
manage with the living. This is not the case when using frozen gametes 
of the dead. The banks can be regulated as to the disposition of the dece-
dent's gametes. Additionally, there is no reason not to regulate simply 
because it has not been done before. 172 At this point, the law is providing 
for the welfare of the would-be child by tailoring this child's birth closely 
to that of the traditional posthumous child and is simultaneously limiting 
the dangers of state involvement in determining who should procreate. A 
traditional purpose behind procreation is the desire to have a genetically-
related child to rear. The decedent will never experience the rearing of 
the genetically-related child. Society's interest in not deliberately creat-
ing orphans and in the foreseeable ramifications of how the living will 
care for posthumously-conceived children justify limiting the number of 
posthumously- conceived children for a decedent. 173 
If posthumous conception is allowed, the law must provide the same 
benefits for the would-be child as it does for the posthumously-born child 
of traditional procreation. Current paternity and maternity laws do not 
protect posthumously-conceived children. The vast majority of the chil-
dren are not legally legitimate regardless of their parent's marital status 
171. The court in Hall, 647 So. 2d at 1351, similarly analyzed that allowing posthumous 
conception to occur prior to determining whether the donation of the frozen sperm to the donee 
was valid would cause irreparable harm to the living, not that an unconceived child would be 
harmed by never having been born. 
172. In one high profile case, a physician had fraudulently used his own sperm to 
impregnate as many as 70 different women. Deborah Sharp, Fla. Suit Highlights In-vitro 
Industry's Controversies, USA TODAY. Nov. 15, 1996, at 3A. 
173. Typically, births to unwed teenagers, welfare recipients, and other single women are 
considered to be examples of irresponsible procreation. See Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" 
Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339 (1996). Should not unrestricted posthumous conception also 
fall into this category? 
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because birth occurs more than 300 days after the death of one parent. 
Moreover, children conceived posthumously are in a different class than 
are children conceived by living, unwed parents because they are unable 
to establish the parent-child relationship with their deceased parent under 
present law. 174 For example, they will not be automatically175 eligible, as 
are the traditional posthumous children, for such benefits as social secu-
rity survivor benefits, 176 worker's compensation benefits, 177 pension bene-
174. In 1962 Professor W. Barton Leach raised this issue in connection with the 
administration of estates, trusts, and the Rule Against Perpetuities. See W. Barton Leach, 
Perpetuities In The Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the Fenile Decedent, 48 A.B.A . .J 942 
(1962). So did Winthrop D. Theis in 1971. See Winthrop D. Theis, A Look To the Future.· 
Property Rzghts and the Posthumously Conceived Child, II 0 TR. & EsT. 922 ( 1971) (suggesting 
a comprehensive statute, which he entitled the Uniform Rights of the Posthumously Conceived 
Child Act). 
175. They might be if the statute provides a longer period than the traditional 300 days for 
the child to be born after the death of the parent. See, e.g, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-25(2)(11) 
(1995) (when a taxpayer creates a family education account, a taxpayer's posthumous child 
becomes the qualified beneficiary if delivered alive within 11 months from the Jate of death). 
176. The Social Security Act provides survivorship benefits for children of deceased parents. 
The present social security law on paternal survivor benefits regarding a traditional, posthumously 
born child differentiates on the basis of status at birth. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C). If the status is 
legitimate, the child receives full social security benefits. If the status is illegitimate. the law 
imposes more qualification requirements. See. Kelly Wall Schemcnauer, Comment, Adams v. 
Weinberger and Dubinski v. Bowen: Posthumous Illegitimate Children and the Social Security 
System, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1213 (1988). 
Posthumously-conceived chtldren would not qualify even as posthumous illegitimate children. 
See Hart v. Sha1ala, No. 94-3922 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1993). 
177. Almost all states provide for the traditional posthumous child to qualify as a child of 
the deceased parent for worker's compensation benefits. Ala. Code ~ 25-5-1(2) (1996); Alaska 
Stat.§ 23.30.265(6) (1995); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 23-1064(:1) (1996); Ark. Code Ann.§ 11-9· 
102(2) (Michie 1995); Cal. Lab. Code § 3503 (West 1996); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-41-
501(1)(b) (West 1996); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 2301(2) (1995); D.C. Code Ann.§ 36-301(4) 
(1996); Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 440.02(5) (West 1996); Ga. Code Ann.§ 34-9-lJ(a)(l) (1996); Guam 
Code Ann.§ 9103© (1995); Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 386-2 (1996); Idaho Code§ 72-102(8)(c) (1996); 
Idaho Code § 72-440 (1996); 111. Ann. Stat., ch. 820, para. 305/7(a) (Smith-llurd 1996); Ind. Code 
Ann. § 22-3-3-l<J(b) (West 1996); Ind. Code Ann. § 22-3-7-13(b) (West 1996); Ky. Rev Stat 
Ann.§ 342.085(1) (Baldwin 1996); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 1021(3) (West 1996); Me. Rev. Stat 
Ann. tit. 39-A, § 102(8)(C) (West 1995); Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Employment ~ 9-10l(c)(3l 
(1996); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152, § 3211.~ (West 1996); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 176.0 II (West 
1996); Miss. Code Ann.~ 71-3-3(1) (1995); Mo. Ann. Stat.§ 287.240(4)(b) (Vernon 1996); Mont. 
Code Ann.§ 39-71-116(7) (1995); Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 48-124 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat.~ 616C070 
(1995); N.H Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 281-A:2(V) (1995); N.J.Stat. Ann.§ 34:15-13 (West 1096): N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 52-1-18 (Michie 1996); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-3-13(B) (Michie 1996); NY Est. 
Powers & Trusts Law§ 2(11) (McKinney 1996); N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 97-2(12) (1995); N.D. Cent. 
Code§ 65-01-02(8) (1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4123.01(D) (Baldwin 1996); Okla. Stat. Ann 
tit. 85, § 3.1(3) (West 1996); Or. Rev. Stat.§ 656.005(5) (1995); 77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 562 
(1996); 77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 1407 (1996); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11, § 3(5)(2) (1994); SC. 
Code Ann.§ 42-1-70 (Law. Co-op. 1995); Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-71(2) (1996); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35A-3-403(3)(b) (1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 601(2) (1')95); Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-
515(A)(4)(8) (Michie 1995); W.Va. Code§ 23-4-10(d) (1996); Wis. Stat. Ann.§ !02.51(4) (West 
1996); Wyo. Stat.§ 27-14-102(a)(iii) (1996). 
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fits, m inheritance benefits, 179 etc. 180 The law must, therefore, be reformed 
to accommodate these children. 181 
178. Many states have specific provisions providing for the traditional posthumous child's 
right to the deceased parent's pension benefits. Ala. Code§ 31-3-l(a)(2) (1996) (upon the death 
of national guardsmen, their posthumous children are eligible for benefits); D.C. Code Ann. § 1-
624.1 (9) (1996) (upon the death of government employees, their posthumous children are eligible 
for disability compensation benefits); Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, para. 5/12-137 (Smith-Hurd 1996) 
(upon the death of park and retirement board employees, their posthumous children are eligible 
for pension benefits); Md. Ann. Code art. 41, § 4-1002(a)(3) (1996) (upon the death of law 
enforcement employees, their posthumous children are eligible for pension benefits); Md. Ann. 
Code art. 41, § 4-1 004(a)(3) (1996) (upon the death of law enforcement employees, their 
posthumous children are eligible for pension benefits); Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 299A.41 (West 1996) 
(upon the death of public safety officers, their posthumous children are eligible for survivor 
benefits); Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 352C.021 (West 1996); Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 352C.04 (West 1996) 
(upon the death of elective state officers, their posthumous children are eligible for retirement 
benefits); N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 205 (McKinney 1996) (upon the death of firemen and 
policemen, their posthumous children are eligible for benefits); N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law 
§ 3(5) (McKinney 1996) (Chapter 64-B: upon the death of volunteer ambulance workers, their 
posthumous children are eligible for benefits); N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 3(5) (McKinney 
1996) (Chapter 64-A: upon the death of volunteer firefighters, their posthumous children are 
eligible for benefits); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.§ 41.26.030(7)(iii) (West 1996) (upon the death of 
law enforcement officers and firefighters, their posthumous children are eligible for retirement 
benefits); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 51.08.030 (West 1996) (upon the death of industrial insurance 
workers, their posthumous children are eligible for benefits). 
179. Many states have statutes specifically providing that a decedent's descendant. relative, 
or heir who was conceived prior to the decedent's death but born afterwards inherits from the 
decedent as if born in the decedent's lifetime. These statutes provide for the traditional 
posthumous child. Ala. Code § 25-51-1 (2) (199{) ); Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-210 (Michie 1995); 
Cal. Prob. Code§ 6407 (West 1996); D.C. Code Ann.§ 19-314 (1996); Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 532-9 
(1996); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 755, para. 5/2-3 (Smith-Hurd 1996); Ind. Code Ann.§ 29-1-2-6 (West 
19%); Iowa Code Ann.§ 633.220 (West 1996); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 391070 (Baldwin 1996); 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, § 2-108 (West 1995); Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts § 3-107 
(19'l6); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 700.109(2) (West 1996); Mo. Ann. Stat.§ 474.050 (Vernon 
1'!96); N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 38:5-8 (West 1996); N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 3A:4-10 (West 1996); NY. Est. 
Powers & Trusts Law§ 4-1.1(9 (McKinney 1996); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2105.14 (Baldwin 
1996); W.Va. Code§ 42-l-8 (1996); Wis. Stat. Ann.§ 852.03(4) (West 1996); Wyo. Stat.§ 2-4-
103 (19'.16). 
The traditional posthumous born child would also qualify as a pretermitted heir in these states. 
Cal. Prob. Code§ 6570 (West 1996); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 755, para. 5/4-10 (Smith-Hurd 1996); Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 394.382(1) (Baldwin 1995); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 191, § 20 (West 1996); 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 700.127(1) (West 1996); Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 525.20 (West 1996); Miss. 
Code Ann.§ 91-5-3 (1995); Miss. Code Ann. § 91-5-5 (1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.) 551 10 
(1995); N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 3A:4-ll (West 1996); N.J Stat. Ann.§ 3B:5-16 (West 1996); NY Est. 
Powers & Trusts Law § 2-1.3(a)(2) (McKinney 1996); N.Y Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-
3.2(a)(l)(A) (McKinney 1996); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-5.5(a) (1995); 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann 
§ 2507(4) (1996); R.L Gen. Laws § 33-6-24 (1995); R.L Gen. Laws § 33·6-27 ( 1995); S.C. Code 
Ann.§ 62-2-302(a) (Law. Co-op. 1995); Tenn. Code Ann.§ 32-3-103(9 (1996); Tex. Prob. Code 
Ann. § 67(a) (West 1996); Va. Code Ann.§ 64.1-71 (Michie 1096). Wis. Stat. Ann. § 777.41 
(West 1996); Wis. Stat. Ann.§ 853.25(1) (West 1996). 
A will is revoked in Georgia if a testator does not contemplate and does not provide for the 
traditional posthumous child. Ga. Code Ann. § 53-4-48(a) ( 1996 ). 
180. Several states provide under the crime victim compensation act that the traditional 
posthumous children are eligible for benefits. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-4.1-1 02(3) (West 1996); 
Mo. Ann. Stat.§ 595.010(1) (Vernont 1996); Or. Rev. Stat.§ 147.005(3) (1995); Tex. Crim. Proc. 
Code Ann. § 56.32(a)(5)(C) (1996); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-368.4(A)(2) (Michie 1996). 
181 A number of commentators have suggested refonn to provide benefits for posthumously 
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The approach to reforming the law should be guided by the principle 
of providing a minimum quality of life for the child. 182 Accordingly, the 
benefits for this class of children should be aligned closely to those bene-
fits received by the traditional class of children born posthumously. The 
present laws should at least be reformed so that these children may have 
a longer time period to establish parenthood with the deceased parent. 
Despite the need, a close alignment between benefits for traditional post-
humous children and posthumously-conceived children may be impossi-
ble because of other competing policy concerns. For example, the state's 
interests in decedents' estates for the orderly disposition of property and 
stable land titles may require a minimum time period in which 
posthumously-conceived children may be born and be eligible for inheri-
tance from the deceased parent. 183 
Whether it would be too onerous to require the decedent to make spe-
cial financial arrangements for such children is also an important consid-
eration. The principle of a minimum quality of life does not equate to the 
financial circumstances of the progenitors; thus, the poor will not suffer 
discrimination. However, this principle does require a consideration of 
the decedent's ability to provide economically for the child. For example, 
in Hecht, 1s4 Mr. Kane made some provision in his will for the would-be 
child. 185 In Hall, 186 the court, in determining whether Mr. Hall had in-
tended that his frozen sperm be used for posthumous conception, consid-
ered the fact that he had made no provision for the child in his will nor 
had made inter-viv0s arrangements. The concern for the economic wel-
fare of the child may be a clue as to how society may judge responsibility 
and the dead hand. The philosophical concept of leaving part of one's self 
behind is largely an element of narcissism. The emphasis should not be 
conceived or gestated embryos. See, e.g., Theis, supra note 174, at 922-23 (proposing topics to 
be covered in an unifmm statute to provide rights for the posthumously-conceived child); Ellen 
J. Garside, Comment, Posthumous Progeny: A Proposed Resolution To The Dilemma Of The 
Posthumouslv Concei1•ed Child, 41 LOY. L. REV. 713 (1996) (suggesting amendments to Louisiana 
law); Lisa M. Burkdall, Note, A Dead Man's Tale: Regulating The Right To Bequeath Sperm In 
California, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 875, 903-07 ( 1995) (suggesting amendments to California law); 
Djalleta, supra note 46, at 367-70 (proposing changes to the Uniform Probate Code). 
182. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, 98 U.L.A. § 4 (Supp. 
19')4 ), focuses on the public policies of finality and of the interests of children of assisted 
reproduction who arc born prior to the death of the parent. Garside, supra note 181, at 726-27 
This Act provides that children who are posthumously conceived or gestated have no parent-child 
relationship with the gamete providers. Only two states have enacted statutes modeled on this Act. 
Virginia allows the posthumously conceived child to be treated as a traditional posthumously born 
child as long as the child is born within ten months of the decedent's death. VA. CoDE ANN. 
§ 20.154 (Michie Supp. 1994). North Dakota follows the USCACA and the posthumously 
conceived child must be in utero at the decedent's death. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04 (1991 ). 
183 See Garside, supra note 181, at 731. 
184. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). 
185. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275. 
18o. 647 So. 2d 1348 (1994). 
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on the rights of a parent to conceive posthumously, but rather, on the 
parent's responsibility for the posthumously-conceived child. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Posthumous conception puts the welfare of the would-be child 
squarely on the table as a societal issue, necessitating government in-
volvement. Although the autonomy of the individual in making personal, 
intimate decisions is a fundamental concept in our society, the decision to 
conceive posthumously as a personal decision extends the dead hand too 
far into the affairs of the living. Accordingly, this article suggests that the 
law take a more interventionalist approach toward this novel aspect of 
conception. The state does have an interest in regulating posthumous con-
ception to protect the would-be child's interest in a minimum quality of 
life. This interest outweighs the interests of the decedent from having 
complete autonomy in making the decision to conceive posthumou~ly. 
